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Abstract—Autonomous vehicle capable of navigating unpre-
dictable real-world environments with little human feedback are
a reality today. Such systems rely heavily on on-board sensors
such as cameras, radar/LIDAR, and GPS as well as capabilities
such as 3G/4G connectivity and V2V/V2I communication to make
real time maneuvering decisions. Autonomous vehicle control
imposes very strict requirements on the security of the commu-
nication channels used by the vehicle to exchange information as
well as the control logic that performs complex driving tasks, e.g.,
adapting vehicle velocity, or changing lanes. This study presents a
first look at the effects of security attacks on the communication
channel as well as sensor tampering of a connected vehicle
stream equipped to achieve Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control
(CACC). Our simulation results show that an insider attack can
cause significant instability in the CACC vehicle stream. We also
illustrate how different countermeasures, such as downgrading
to ACC mode, could potentially be used to improve security and
safety of the connected vehicle streams.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous driverless cars have recently received much
publicity with successful demonstrations by Google, whose
self-driving car has completed over 700,000 autonomous-
driving miles across cities in the U.S.1. Levinson et al. [1]
present algorithms used in “Junior” –Stanford’s autonomous
vehicle that is capable of performing complex driving tasks
in real time in unpredictable traffic conditions. While these
ambitious forward-looking projects are currently in the proof-
of-concept stage, lower levels of function-specific automation
like Cruise Control (CC), and combined function automation2
such as ACC (Adaptive Cruise Control) are already finding
their way into deployment in certain high-end automobiles.
CACC (Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control) is an extension
to the ACC that leverages inter-vehicle communications to
create tightly-coupled vehicle stream [2].
To achieve automated cooperative driving, vehicles need to
have access to each other’s information. Such information en-
This work is partly supported by NSF CMMI-1301496 grant and Intel
Science and Technology Center for Secure Computing.
1Google Official Blog, The latest chapter for the self-driving car: mastering
city street driving
2U.S. Department of Transportation, Policy on Automated Vehicle Devel-
opment
hances the ability of the autonomous vehicle to plan ahead and
make better decisions to improve the overall safety and per-
formance of the vehicle. One possible way of achieving inter-
vehicle communication is through Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
(VANET). We refer to vehicles that participate in information-
sharing and cooperative driving through VANET commu-
nications as connected vehicle stream. Although VANET
technologies have matured over time, they are still riddled
with security issues. Engoulou et al. [3] present the most
recent survey of various security issues in VANETs including
security requirements, attacks, and privacy protection. Faults
in software components can potentially lead to devastating
effects for autonomous vehicles and other vehicles sharing
the roadway. Thus, it is important to design the system to
be robust, secure against malicious attacks, privacy preserving
and fault tolerant.
The Security Credential Management System (SCMS), de-
veloped under a cooperative agreement with the United States
Department of Transportation (USDOT), is currently the lead-
ing candidate for V2V security backend design in the U.S. [4].
These efforts focus on securing the V2X communication chan-
nels over Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE)
standard. Relatively, little attention has been given to the
safety and security of VANET control protocols in autonomous
vehicles, and the impact of different security attacks in the
presence of an adversary and bad-faith participants. Compro-
mising sensor input or control protocols can lead to incorrect
decisions made by autonomous vehicles, leading to dynamic
interactions between vehicles that threaten the stability and
safety of autonomous vehicle streams.
Blum et al. [5] argue that jamming attacks can cause
collisions in a vehicle platoon, leading to serious multicar
pile-up. Guette et al. [6] present a security model based on
Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and describe an application
of cooperative driving and its associated threat model. These
prior works only discuss a limited number of attacks and
none of them consider the actual vehicle longitudinal control
in CACC. As a result, these studies ignore other impacts
that a security attack might have on a platoon such as string
instability. Moreover, none of these studies have carried out
any quantitative analysis of the impact of the attacks. Our main
contributions in this work are:
Analysis of security risks in autonomous vehicle stream:
we perform a study of the security vulnerabilities and risks as-
sociated with deploying VANET communication in connected
vehicle streams to achieve automated sensing and control such
as CACC. We consider various types of what-if scenarios when
communications between autonomous vehicles participating in
CACC are compromised. In addition, we examine existing
countermeasures, explore limitations of these methods and
possible ways to alleviate negative effects.
Quantitative analysis of security attacks: VENTOS (VE-
hicular NeTwork Open Simulator) is an integrated open-
source simulator we have developed to study VANET-based
traffic applications. CACC car-following model based on one-
vehicle look-ahead communication utilizing IEEE 802.11p
were implemented in VENTOS in order to study various
what-if scenarios involving security attacks on CACC vehicle
stream. In particular, we present simulation results on the
impact of application and network layer attacks by a malicious
insider on the performance of a CACC vehicle stream.
II. COOPERATIVE ADAPTIVE CRUISE CONTROL (CACC)
CACC is an enhancement of ACC, and we consider it as
a case study of cooperative driving of autonomous vehicles.
CACC incorporates wireless V2V communication to access
rich preview information about the surrounding vehicles. This
leads to tighter following gaps and faster response to changes
than ACC, and makes collaborative driving such as platooning
feasible. In this study, parameter exchange in CACC vehicle
stream is done through beacons that are periodic single-hop
messages broadcasted by each vehicle.
We consider a CACC vehicle stream that is moving on a
straight single-lane highway. The vehicles utilize a simple one-
vehicle look-ahead communication scheme as shown in Fig.
1a. Each CACC vehicle is listening to beacon messages sent
wirelessly using IEEE 802.11p from its immediate preceding
vehicle. The vehicles then utilize the speed, position, accelera-
tion and other information embedded in these beacon messages
to achieve a distributed longitudinal control. Details on the
CACC control design are discussed in [2].
We assume that the platoon of vehicles is already formed
and is traveling on a straight single-lane highway with no
need to change the platoon size or perform maneuvers (split,
merge, leave, etc). There will be no need for a platoon
management protocol and the platoon leader acts only as the
first vehicle in the platoon and makes disturbance by slowing
down or speeding up. Thus, the only active communication
between CACC vehicles is beaconing that is used to exchange
necessary parameters for longitudinal controller.
III. SECURITY ATTACKS ON CACC VEHICLE STREAM
We group the security attacks on a CACC vehicle stream
as application layer, network layer, system level, and privacy
leakage attacks. All these attacks can potentially impact the
string stability of the system and compromise the safety
and privacy of the passengers of the CACC vehicle stream.
Such attacks can be launched either by an outsider or insider
adversary. While leveraging state-of-the-art security architec-
tures can potentially limit the capabilities of outsider attacks,
there can still be disruptive insider attacks. In the following
subsections, we discuss the various categories of security
attacks in more depth.
A. Application Layer Attacks
Application layer attacks affect the functionality of a par-
ticular application such as CACC beaconing, or message
exchange in the platoon management protocol. The adver-
sary can use message falsification (modification), spoofing
(masquerading), or replay attacks to maliciously affect the
vehicle stream. The impact of such attacks can be a temporary
instability in the vehicle stream and in severe cases it can lead
to rear-end collision.
In the message falsification attack, the adversary starts
listening to the wireless medium, and upon receiving each
beacon, manipulates the content meaningfully and rebroad-
casts it as depicted in Fig. 2a. Changing the value of different
fields in a beacon might have different effects on the system
depending on the implementation of the vehicle’s longitudinal
control system. For instance, changing the acceleration field
might have a more significant effect than changing the velocity.
In the spoofing attack, the adversary impersonates another
vehicle in the stream in order to inject fraudulent information
into a specific vehicle. In one-vehicle look-ahead communi-
cation, the adversary can impersonate the vehicle preceding
the target vehicle, even when the attacker is physically distant
from the target vehicle. Note that ’in-transit traffic tampering
attack’ in order to modify, delay, or drop messages is not
applicable in CACC vehicle stream. This is due to the fact that
all communications are single-hop and no vehicle is acting as
a relay node in the system.
In a replay attack, the adversary receives and stores a beacon
sent by a member of the stream and tries to replay it at a
later point of time with malicious intent. The replayed beacon
contains old information which can lead to hazardous effects.
For instance, consider a scenario where a CACC vehicle
stream is moving forward with speed of 30 m/s (108 km/h).
The adversary captures a beacon, and stores it for later use.
When the leading vehicle slows down, the adversary injects
the old beacon into the system periodically. Following vehicles
still think that the leading vehicle is driving with 30 m/s and
they will not slow down, potentially leading to a collision.
State-of-the-art security architectures employing a strong
cryptographic system have the potential to effectively thwart
application layer attacks in the case where the adversary is an
untrusted outsider. Digital signatures provide data integrity for
beacon messages, and protect them from unauthorized change.
In addition to data integrity, digital signatures also provide au-
thentication (both peer entity, and data-origin authentication),
as well as non-repudiation (with the help of a trusted third
party) services. Moreover, using nonce in the messages which
is an arbitrary number (chosen in a pseudo-random process)
used only once in communication, is a technique to prevent
replay attacks.
Although the above methods are well known, there are
practical challenges involved in deployment, implementation
and standardization of such security architectures in VANET.
This is due to the scale of the proposed VANET network
and varying interpretations of what constitutes “security and
privacy” in various areas of the world [3]. Furthermore, in
the case where the adversary is a trusted insider such as a
compromised vehicle with a valid certificate, the problem is
much harder to solve. Typical approaches to handling this
issue is via misbehavior/anomaly detection techniques such
as [7] which require multiple sources of data which may
not always be available. In addition, such techniques do not
guarantee perfect detection in all circumstances and are usually
associated with finite false negative and false positive rates.
There is much left to be done in the anomaly detection
field to ensure acceptable performance of these algorithms to
ensure the safety of passengers in the fully autonomous driving
scenario.
B. Network Layer Attacks
Unlike application layer attacks, network layer attacks have
the potential to affect the functioning of multiple user appli-
cations. For instance, the adversary can attempt a Denial-of-
Service (DoS) or Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack
to overwhelm the communication capability of a vehicle or
a group of vehicles, and make them unable to participate
properly in a CACC vehicle stream.
A known method to realize DoS in the VANET scenario
is by using a vehicular botnet. Mevlut et al. [8] demonstrate
the problems vehicular botnets introduce to the autonomous
car setting via a simulation study. In their work, they focus
on producing physical congestion on a given road segment
and do not discuss the effects of network level congestion
through botnets of compromised cars. It is envisioned that
autonomous cars are equipped with a tamper-proof Hardware
Security Module (HSM) which is responsible for storing dig-
ital keys as well as performing all cryptographic operations,
such as message signing/verification, encryption, and hashing
[9]. These cryptographic operations are complex and CPU-
intensive, hence, there is an upper-bound in the number of
cryptographic operations a HSM can perform at a time. A
DoS/DDoS attack can target this limitation to overwhelm an
autonomous vehicle and make its HSM unavailable.
Radio jamming to deliberately disrupt communications over
small or wide geographic areas as depicted in Fig. 2c is
another possible network layer DoS attack. IEEE 802.11p
standard uses one control channel (CCH) with multiple service
channels (SCH). The adversary can use different jamming
techniques like one-channel jamming or swiping between all
channels and trying to jam them all. We would need a system
such as [10] to help detect and mitigate such attacks. Other
countermeasures for DoS attack in CACC vehicle stream
involve traditional solutions such as channel switching, tech-
nology switching, frequency hopping, or utilizing multiple
radio transceivers. If none of these techniques are feasible,
a CACC vehicle may need to downgrade to the ACC system
to help avoid a rear-end collision.
C. System Level Attacks
All presented attacks so far were centered around exploiting
V2V communication in a CACC vehicle stream. Another type
of attack is tampering with vehicle hardware or software that
can be done by a malicious insider in the manufacturing
level or by an outsider in an unattended vehicle (for instance
by replacing or altering certain vehicle sensors). Even if
the communication channel is secure, and a state-of-the-art
security architecture is deployed in VANET, if the on-board
hardware/software are tampered with or faulty, then the input
information to the system will not be accurate. This will affect
the operation of the high-level protocols as illustrated in Fig.
2d. Hence, the risk of tampering should not be neglected.
One possible solution is to use tamper-proof sensors. If a
tamper-proof version is not available or too expensive to be
deployed in large scale, then misbehavior detection techniques
discussed in Section V can be useful. It is worth mentioning
that in general, the term “tamper-proof” hardware means
100% secure against tampering which is mostly used by
marketing specialists and does not exist in practice. There are
different technologies to make a device less vulnerable against
tampering, and tamper resistance, tamper evidence, tamper
detection, and tamper response are more accurate terms used
to characterize such technologies [11], but these are out of
scope of this paper.
D. Privacy Leakage Attacks
CACC vehicles periodically broadcast beacons that contains
various information such as the vehicle identity, current vehicle
position, speed, acceleration, etc. The availability of this
information can comprise the privacy. The adversary can carry
out an eavesdropping attack as shown in Fig. 2b to extract
valuable information about the vehicle stream such as their
trace by linking position data, and use them for her own
benefit. The presence of signatures in the beacon messages
can worsen the situation, and allow the adversary to easily
identify the participating vehicles in the CACC stream.
Eavesdropping is a type of passive attack, and hence difficult
to detect, especially in broadcast wireless communication.
However, it is possible to prevent the success of eavesdropping
by using encryption to achieve data privacy or using anonymity
techniques to achieve identity and location privacy. Anonymity
is typically implemented using group signatures [12] or short-
term certificates (pseudonyms) [13]. Many privacy-preserving
security architectures in VANET are using pseudonym-based
schemes to keep the information private, but their applicability
in a platoon requires more detailed investigation, and is out of
the scope of this paper.
IV. SIMULATION STUDY
A. Simulation Setting
In order to study some of the discussed attacks on a CACC
vehicle system, we utilize the VENTOS (Vehicular Network
Open Simulator) platform3. VENTOS is an integrated sim-
ulator, and is made up of many different modules, including
Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) and OMNET++/Veins.
SUMO4 is adopted as our traffic simulator and while OM-
NET++5 is used to simulate the wireless communication. Our
ACC and CACC car-following models are implemented to
replace the default car-following model in SUMO. Moreover,
Traffic Control Interface (TraCI) which is responsible for
data/command exchange between SUMO and OMNET++ is
extended with new set of commands to gain necessary control
over parameters exchange for ACC/CACC vehicles. Detailed
packet-level simulation is performed in OMNET++, and IEEE
802.11p protocol, the standard protocol adopted for V2V
communication in Veins (Vehicles in Network Simulation)
framework6, is used for wireless communication between
CACC vehicles.
VENTOS allows us to study situations where the driverless
vehicles utilize V2V communication to achieve CACC, and
analyze the local and string stability of the system under
different speed profiles. Stability is a critical requirement for
both ACC and CACC control system design and is achieved
by dampening traffic flow disturbances [14]. Local stability
concerns with one vehicle following a preceding vehicle. A
system is said to be local stable if the magnitude of distur-
bance decreases with time. String stability, also referred to as
platoon stability and asymptotic stability, concerns with the
propagation of disturbance in a string of vehicles. String stable
means disturbance damps out when propagating to upstream
vehicles.
We present simulation results of performing application
and network layer security attacks with a malicious insider
adversary. The insider adversary is on the side of the road with
fixed position and is equipped with a radio to communicate
with other vehicles in the network. In the application layer
attack, we consider message falsification that the adversary
modifies the CACC beacon messages in order to affect the
stream. In the network layer attack, we consider radio jamming
that all wireless communications are disrupted.
B. Results
Fig. 3 shows the speed profile of ten autonomous/driveless
CACC vehicles that are moving on a straight single-lane
highway when no insider adversary is present. The first vehicle
(platoon leader) is referred to as ‘Veh 1’ and its speed profile is
given and shown with a dashed blue line. As Veh 1 accelerates
and decelerates, the disturbance propagates to the following
vehicles. At t = 120 s, Veh 1 accelerates at 1.5m/s2 to a
3http://rubinet.ece.ucdavis.edu/projects/ventos
4Simulation of Urban MObility (SUMO), http://goo.gl/Al4w07
5OMNet++ Network Simulation, http://www.omnetpp.org/
6Veins, http://veins.car2x.org/
cruise speed of 20m/s. Then it decelerates to speed of 5m/s
with deceleration of −2m/s2. The other nine vehicles follow
with uniform time gap setting. As can be seen, the system is
stable, and vehicles follow each other smoothly.
Fig. 4 presents the speed profile of the same vehicle stream
in the presence of a malicious insider vehicle that is using
message falsification attack in order to compromise the system.
At t = 147 s, CACC vehicle stream enters into the radio
range of the adversary and gets affected by it. The adversary
tries to manipulate the acceleration field of beacon messages
to a fix value of 6m/s2. Due to the fact that no security
features are implemented in vehicles, they accept the falsified
beacons and use them for longitudinal control which leads to
string instability in the stream, and this disturbance magnifies
through the stream. Here, falsification attack is most effective
when a sudden change in acceleration occurs.
We note that since the attacker in this case is an insider,
cryptographic security in terms of digital signatures/certificates
by itself will not be able to prevent the attack. We will need
more elaborate misbehavior detection measures as mentioned
earlier to help mitigate this problem. In essence, the speed
profile of the vehicle stream will look similar to the one in
Fig.4 even in the presence of security measures such as digital
signatures/certificates.
Fig. 5 illustrates the space-gap between vehicles before and
after of radio jamming attack. Before radio jamming, space-
gap is 16m when the CACC vehicle stream is traveling with
speed of 20m/s (mark 1), and 5.5m in speed of 5m/s (mark
2). The insider adversary disrupts all communications in CCH
starting from t = 308 s (mark 3). Failure to receive beacons,
CACC vehicles downgrade to ACC mode with larger time-
gap and delay settings. As a result, the space-gap is increased
to 26m (mark 4) and reaction of followers to speed changes
becomes relatively slower (mark 5). Downgrading to ACC
is a simple countermeasure that diminishes the impact of
radio jamming attack from a rear-end collision to reduction
in CACC performance. We leave designs of more elaborate
countermeasures to the insider jamming attack for future work.
V. POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES FOR DETECTING
MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR
In this section, we explore some possibilities to help secure
CACC vehicle streams by detecting the compromised or faulty
sensor/vehicle. These could have implications for vehicles with
varying levels of automation, from WAVE-enabled vehicles
with ACC/CACC capabilities to fully automated driver-less
vehicles.
A. Local Plausibility Check
A simple approach in detecting a faulty sensor is to check
whether the incoming information is plausible or not [15]. For
instance, if a sensor is not reading within its normal range,
then the sensor may be faulty or tampered with. The incorrect
information can be either discarded or interpolated from the
past correct information. Another possibility is deriving the
information from other relevant sensors. For instance, if the
wheel speed sensor is compromised and faulty, then the
velocity can be derived from the engine speed sensor.
B. Wearables and Mobile Devices
Wearable devices such as the Google Glass and mobile
devices such as smartphones and tablets carry a wide array of
sensors such as cameras, accelerometer, and GPS along with
wireless communication capability. These devices are carried
by the driver or passengers of a vehicle. This opens up rich
opportunity for developing applications which can potentially
improve the security and safety of the system. For instance,
the wearable/mobile device of the driver or passenger can act
as a verifier for the sensing data generated or received by the
vehicle. The wearable device can construct a “belief” from
its sensor data about the position of the vehicle, velocity, or
acceleration, and cross check this with the belief computed
by the vehicle. If there is a discrepancy in the beliefs as seen
from the wearable device and the vehicle, then it might be
an indicator of a security compromise of the hardware or
software in the car, or in the communication channel. If the
passenger has multiple devices, it might be possible to fuse the
sensor information from these devices to construct a more well
formed belief which can then be checked against the vehicle’s
belief.
C. Voting
The two approaches described above are based on local
detection of misbehaving sensor/software or compromised
communication. If this fails, collaborative decision-making
techniques such as voting could be carried out that enable
vehicles to collectively shield themselves against the misbe-
having vehicle. Voting is most effective in scenarios where
there are multiple vehicles in a group that are coordinating
with one another. A group of vehicles can be defined as nearby
vehicles driving within a geographic region, or members of a
vehicle platoon. Vehicles in a group keep track of each other’s
behavior and check for anomalies in the data received from
the members of the group and possibly other vehicles on the
road. The vehicles then perform a trust computation and then
vote for/against keeping the vehicle in the group. This process
needs to be done at regular intervals and therefore incurs
communication overheads. More detailed study is needed to
understand the trade-offs between performance and cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mainstream car manufacturers such as Tesla, BMW, and
Audi are all working on commercial versions of vehicles with
varying levels of automation embedded in them. With the
increased reliance on sensors and computer software to take
driving decisions for passengers, addressing security issues
will become very important with time. This work is an attempt
towards gaining a better understanding of the security risks
involved in connected vehicle streams, from WAVE-enabled
vehicles with ACC/CACC capabilities to fully automated
driver-less vehicles. We analyze different security attacks on
a vehicle stream and discuss the possible security design
decisions which will need to be taken to ensure safety of the
system. The impact of the security attack such as rear-end
collision or instability of the stream is shown with the help of
simulation where we implement the ACC/CACC longitudinal
control and perform a detailed packet-level simulation.
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Fig. 1. One-vehicle look-ahead communication in CACC vehicle stream. ith vehicle receives information embedded in beacon messages from (i−1)th vehicle
using V2V wireless communication, and feeds it into the longitudinal control system to maintaining a safe gap from the preceding vehicle. Longitudinal
control system in each vehicle is typically designed as a hierarchical two-level controller [2].
Fig. 2. Security attacks on a CACC vehicle stream.
Fig. 3. Speed profile of CACC vehicle stream with no adversary. The system is stable and as ’Veh 1’ speeds up and slows down, all vehicles follow each
other smoothly.
Fig. 4. Effect of message falsification attack on the CACC vehicle stream. String stability is not maintained and the disturbance magnifies through the stream.
Fig. 5. Effect of radio jamming attack on the CACC vehicle stream. The CACC controller detects communication loss at t = 308 s and downgrades to ACC
mode.
